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TAX PROBLEMS OF THE STRAW CORPORATION
LouIs G. BERTANEt
I. 'INTRODUCTION
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing
sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as
possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right,
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law de-
mands; taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contribu-
tions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.'
J UDGE HAND'S OBSERVATION has been a polestar for tax
practitioners in their attempt to chart courses which will further
the business objectives of their clients without simultaneously produc-
ing adverse tax consequences. One of the tools available for achieving
this goal is the straw or nominee corporation. 2
A straw or nominee corporation holds legal title to real or per-
sonal property which is beneficially owned by another. Usually, the
beneficial owners are the corporate shareholders, although they might
be unrelated third parties. The use of a straw or nominee corpora-
tion is often prompted by sound business reasons not involving specific
t Member, California Bar. Tax Counsel II, California State Board of Equali-
zation. B.S., 1960, University of Colorado; J.D., 1968, California Western School of
Law. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those
of the California State Board of Equalization.
1. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
2. The term "straw corporation" is often used to describe any corporate entity
to which legal or record title to property has been transferred, leaving beneficial
ownership in another person or persons. However, for purposes of this article, the
term "straw corporation" will denote a corporation whose shareholders desire its
corporate identity, as a matter of fact, be ignored for tax purposes even though they
concede that as a matter of form it is a corporation. The terms "nominee corporation"
or "corporate nominee," will be used to identify a corporation that admits its cor-
porate existence, both in fact as well as in form, but which relies on its status as an
agent or trustee for its shareholders or other principals in order to avoid taxation.
However, it should be noted that the terms "straw corporation" and "nominee cor-
poration" are used indiscriminately by some courts and commentators.
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tax goals, although, of course, if the corporation is treated as a straw
or nominee for tax purposes, instead of a viable corporation, beneficial
tax consequences will often result. Some of the major nontax reasons
for using a straw or nominee include: compliance with state usury or
investment laws;3 facilitation of the management or conveyance of
property;4 insulation of principals from liability;' assistance in estate
planning;6 and insurance of anonymity of ownership.7
In the typical situation, a corporate shell is first created in com-
pliance with all the requisite formalities. Legal or record title to the
real estate or other property involved is then transferred to the newly
created corporation while equitable or beneficial ownership is retained
by or transferred to the shareholders or other third parties. Although
the property involved is often real estate,8 it may also consist of an
operating business9 or any other property.' °
It is anticipated that for tax purposes the straw corporation's
existence will be ignored or the agency status of the nominee corpora-
tion recognized, and that the income, gain, or loss will be passed on
to the shareholders or other equitable owners of the property without
taxation at the corporate level. Thus, if the corporation is not only
characterized as a straw or nominee, but also treated as one, the non-
tax objectives can be obtained without adverse tax consequences.
However, if the corporation is treated in fact, as well as in form, as a
viable corporation, disaster may result." For example, if property was
conveyed to a straw corporation which is subsequently determined
3. See, e.g., David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 7650 (1973); Dallas Downtown Dev. Co.,
12 T.C. 114 (1949).
4. See, e.g., Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Tomlinson v Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 (1963); John A. Mulligan, 16 T.C. 1489 (1951).
5. See, e.g., Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956); Love v.
United States, 96 F. Supp. 919 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Sam Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. den., 365 U.S. 844 (1961).
7. See generally Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate
Transactions, 22 TAX LAW. 647 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943);
Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956); David F. Bolger, 59 T.C.
760 (1973).
9. See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949);
Greer v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1964); Skarda v. Commissioner, 250
F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957).
10. See, e.g., Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct.
Cf. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) (oil leases) ; Jackson v. Commissioner,
233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956) (shares of stock) ; Lloyd F. Noonan, 52 T.C. 907 (1969),
aff'd per curiam. 451 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1971) (interest in partnership) ; Worth
S.S. Corp., 7 T.C. 654 (1946) (steamship).
11. See generally Kronovet, Straw Corporations: When Will They Be Recog-
nized; What Can and Should Be Done, 39 J. TAx. 54 (1973).
[VOL. 20 : p. 735
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STRAW CORPORATION TAX PROBLEMS
to be viable, and thereafter that same property is transferred back to the
beneficial owners, the latter may realize capital gains to the extent that
the property appreciated in value while held by the corporation. 12 Even
if the corporation retains the property and distributes the income gener-
ated by the property to the beneficial owners, the income may initially
be taxed to the corporation as ordinary corporate income and any dis-
tributions to the beneficial owners will be taxed as dividends, to the
extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.'" On the other hand,
if the transfer of property to and from the straw corporation produces
a loss, or if use of the property generates an operating loss, it is the
corporation's loss, and once the corporation is treated as viable the loss
cannot be passed on to the shareholders for their tax benefit. In view
of the adverse tax consequences which may result when the use of a
straw or nominee corporation fails its intended purpose, the careful
tax planner must effectively anticipate the approach that may be taken
by the federal and state taxing authorities if they challenge the straw
or nominee corporation.' 4 It is the purpose of this article to analyze
the development of current judicial attitudes toward the use of straw
and/or nominee corporations. Consideration will be given first to the
legal development of the treatment of straw corporations, and there-
after, to that of nominee corporations. Although taxation is essentially
statutory in nature, particular emphasis will be given to applicable
court decisions since it is this judicial gloss which primarily concerns
practitioners in the area. Finally, an approach will be suggested which,
if utilized, should enhance the chances of simultaneously achieving
satisfactory tax treatment and desired business objectives.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Traditionally, a distinction between a corporation and its owners
has been recognized in the law of taxation: a corporation is a taxable
entity, separate and independent of its shareholders." However, there
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(c) (3) (A), 1001.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c) (1).
14. Not only does this danger lurk at the federal level but it also exists at the
state level. In the not too distant past, both state personal income taxes and cor-
porate income or franchise taxes were generally regarded as mere nuisances in com-
parison to federal income taxes. However, as state tax rates have gradually increased,
they have become serious factors with which taxplanners must contend. See, e.g.,
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 17041 (West Supp. 1975) (maximum personal income tax
rate of 11 percent) ; id. § 23151(b) (maximum corporate income tax rate of 9 per-
cent) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7302 (Supp. 1975) (maximum personal income tax
rate of 2 percent) ; id. § 7502 (maximum corporate income tax rate of 9 percent).
15. Although some of the major weapons of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
for maintaining this distinction are discussed briefly in this section, the discussion is
general and does not include every device available to taxing authorities.
1974-19751
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are several statutory and judicial exceptions to this general rule. For
example, it has been held that corporate existence, in form, will be dis-
regarded if the alleged corporation is, in fact, a sham."0 Similarly, if
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determines that a particular
transaction between a corporation and its controlling shareholders
lacks economic significance that transaction will be disregarded for
tax purposes. 17 A more subtle approach, employed with some success
by the IRS is premised upon the judicial requirement that income be
taxed to the one who "earns" it.' Thus, if the IRS finds that the
corporation was so inactive that it could not have earned the income,
the income is attributed to the person or persons who actually earned it.'"
Section 4820 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) is a major
tool which the IRS can employ to adjust or set aside transactions
between related taxpayers. Basically, the section authorizes the Com-
missioner to reallocate gross income, deductions, credits, or other allow-
ances of related taxpayers in order to prevent the evasion of taxes or
to reflect more accurately the income of the parties. Section 482 is
specifically directed towards artificial transactions which distort true
income, and the regulations point out that good faith transactions en-
tered into without a tax avoidance motive, but which in fact distort
income, nevertheless invite application of this section.2' The thrust of
other Code sections, such as section 269,22 which permits the Commis-
sioner to challenge corporations formed to avoid taxes by securing
multiple surtax exemptions, has been blunted by relevant provisions of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which substantially reduced the multiple
corporation tax savings and thus the inducement to use multiple cor-
porations as a device to avoid tax. 3
16. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTACE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 15.01.07 (3d ed. 1971); Barr, A Threat to the
Lifeless Corporate Skeleton: Disregarding the Corporate Entity, 51 TAXES 555,
557-58 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1102 (1961), aff'd,
323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
18. See, e.g., Jerome J. Roubik, 53 T.C. 365 (1969) ; Richard Rubin, 51 T.C.
251 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 56 T.C.
1155 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
19. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935).
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269.
23. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended Sections 1561 and 1563 of the Code
by enlarging the categories of corporations deemed to be controlled by the same
ownership and which must, therefore, share a single surtax exemption. Act of Dec.
30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401, 83 Stat. 487, 599-604, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 1561, 1563.
[VOL. 20 : p. 735
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The final preliminary consideration involves the question of
whether the taxpayer encounters the same problems in attempting to
successfully disregard the corporate entity as does the IRS.24  The
Commissioner has considerable power to disregard or recognize a
purported corporate entity.25  In fact, it has been suggested that the
Commissioner may disregard or recognize the corporate entity at his
discretion. In Higgins v. Smith,26 the Supreme Court stated:
A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his affairs as he
may choose and having elected to do some business as a corpora-
tion, he must accept the tax disadvantages.
On the other hand, the Government may not be required to
acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for doing busi-
ness which is most advantageous to him. The Government may
look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed
for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is un-
real or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction
as best serves the purpose of the tax statute. To hold otherwise
would permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation
in the determination of the time and manner of taxation.
In a more recent case, it has been asserted that in order to prevent un-
fair tax avoidance, the Commissioner has not only great freedom in
this respect, but also the duty to disregard the corporate entity under
appropriate circumstances. 28 Conversely, taxpayers usually cannot com-
plain that corporations of their own creation, which may have served
their purposes are shams and should be disregarded.
One commentator has indicated that a study of cases decided
after 1960 indicates that contrary to prior statements, the Commis-
sioner apparently does not have a decided edge over the taxpayers in
contesting these issues. 29  However, despite this observation, others
believe that the taxpayer is at a disadvantage when he attempts to dis-
regard his own creation.80 The taxpayer challenging the existence of
24. See generally Watts, Tax Problems of Regard for the Corporate Entity,
N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 867, 872-73 (1962); Barr, supra note 16, at 558;
Kronovet, supra note 11, at 56.
25. Hay v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1944).
26. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
27. Id. at 477 (footnote omitted).
28. Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395, 399 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961). See also David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760, 767
n.4 (1973).
29. See Kronovet, supra note 11, at 56. But see Commissioner v. State-Adams
Corp., 283 F.2d 395, 399 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); David
F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760, 767 n.4 (1973).
30. For example, it has been stated:
I think there is no merit in the taxpayer's theory that the Commissioner
must disregard the corporate entity of the subsidiary. If a taxpayer itself creates
1974-1975] 739
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a corporate entity must controvert, qualify, or requalify his prior
actions in order to succeed, and accordingly, some adverse inferences
will exist even in the most meritorious cases. The Commissioner is
not similarly burdened, and, in addition, he is aided by the judicial
presumption of correctness which attaches to his factual determina-
tions. Yet, regardless of the position of the parties with respect to
factual determinations, the applicable principles of law remain the same.
III. THE STRAW CORPORATION
A. Preliminary Considerations
The logical starting point for a discussion of straw or nominee
corporations is the 1943 decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner.1  However, before the
seminal decision in Moline is considered, an examination of earlier
judicial approaches to the issue raised in Moline is helpful. The typical
approach is perhaps best illustrated by United States v. Brager Build-
ing and Land Co.82
In Brager, two partners who owned a mortgaged building leased
the property to an unrelated corporation. Thereafter, the senior partner
died, but under the terms of the partnership agreement the partnership
was not dissolved by his death. The surviving partner then organized
a corporation and conveyed the building to it in return from its stock.
It was stipulated that there was no tax avoidance motive behind the
transfer. The sole purpose was to provide an entity to hold legal title to
the property in order to avoid complications when the surviving part-
ner died. The partnership retained complete control of the property. The
corporation engaged in no business activities, had no salaried officers
or employees, and served no purpose other than to passively hold title
to the building. Moreover, it had no actual capital, no bank account,
no office, no books of account, no cash flow, and it did not assume
the mortgage debt. Notwithstanding this factual pattern, the Commis-
and uses a corporation, he cannot require the Commissioner to say it isn't there.
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 596 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
31. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
32. 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941). For similar approaches, see Inland Dev. Co.
v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1941); North Jersey Title Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1936); 112 W. 59th St. Corp. v. Helvering, 68
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Carling Holding Co., 41 B.T.A. 493 (1940); Mark A.
Mayer, 36 B.T.A. 117 (1937); Moro Realty Holding Corp., 25 B.T.A. 1135 (1932),
aff'd per curiarn, 65 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1933). See generally Case, Disregard of
Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation - The Modern Approach, 30 VA. L. REV.
398, 426-30 (1944); Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 7, at 649.
[VOL. 20 : p. 735
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sioner assessed a deficiency against the corporation, charging it with
income consisting of a portion of the rental receipts paid directly by the
tenant to the mortgage trustee. The Fourth Circuit, however, dis-
regarded the corporate fiction and held that the entity should be ignored
for tax purposes. Although the holding was based upon the fact that
the corporation had not been formed for a useful business purpose -
a precursor of the test later adopted in Moline - the court emphasized
that the corporation had no beneficial ownership of the property and
was unable to exercise control over the property.
3 4
The Brager court recognized the general rule that although a
corporation is an entity distinct from its shareholders for tax as
well as other purposes, this technical separateness may be disre-
garded under appropriate circumstances. The court then drew the
critical distinction:
But it is going too far to say that if a taxpayer forms a corpora-
tion for his convenience, he is thereafter estopped from disclosing
the true nature of the arrangement, whenever it is of advantage
to the government to recognize only the corporate form. The
advantage of the taxpayer has been served by many decisions in
which the identity of the corporation and its sole stockholder has
been adjudicated, and we do not understand that this body of the
law has now for practical purposes ceased to exist. In a number
of these cases ... under circumstances quite similar to those found
in the case at bar, it has been held that when a corporation has
been formed merely as an agency to hold title to real estate for the
convenience of the owner, and has served this purpose with little
or no independent activity on its part, the property and the income
therefrom should be regarded as belonging to the stockholder."'
Thus, the primary considerations which concerned most courts prior
to Moline were beneficial ownership of the income producing property
and the ability to exercise control over the corporate property. How-
ever, in Moline the Court removed this requirement that the corpora-
tion be given the beneficial ownership of the property, under the proper
circumstances, mere legal title would be considered a sufficient basis
33. 124 F.2d at 352.
34. Id. at 351-52. See generally Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 7, at 648-49. The
current viability of Brager is questionable. In Joseph Rothafel, 24 CCH Tax. Ct.
Mem. 1524 (1965), the court maintained that Brager had been tacitly overruled by
Moline. This view is supported by one commentator who points out that the Moline
Court had ample opportunity to decide the case on the ."equitable ownership" theory,
but did not do so, positing its own rule instead. Case, supra note 32, at 432-33.
Nevertheless, Brager has never been expressly overruled and as recently as 1971,
was cited with approval in Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1971).
35. 124 F.2d at 351.
1974-1975]
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for treating the corporation as a viable entity. 6 Furthermore, the
ability or inability of a corporation to exercise control over the prop-
erty or the income therefrom likewise ceased to be a dominant factor
in the resolution of this issue. Nevertheless, these two concepts still
have some support3 7 and might even have been determinative in several
post-Moline Tax CouTt decisions.
88
B. The Moline Case
In 1928, at the instigation of his creditors, Uly Thompson
organized a corporation to. serve as a security device in connection
with certain realty which he owned. Thompson conveyed the property
to the corporation which assumed the outstanding mortgages. In re-
turn, Thompson received all the outstanding stock, less qualifying
shares, which he transferred to a voting trust controlled by his credi-
tors. In 1933, the original loans were repaid and control of the corpor-
ation reverted to Thompson., The property held by the corporation
was sold in several parcels between 1933 and 1936. The proceeds from
the sales were received!by Thompson and deposited in his account. Until
1933 the only business in which the corporation had engaged consisted
of the assumption of Thompson's obligation to .the original creditors,
the defense of certain condemnation proceedings and the institution of
a suit to remove some prior restrictions on the property. Thompson
personally paid these, litigation expenses. In 1934, part of the prop-
erty was leased as a parking. lot. Th e corporation did not transact
any business after the sale: of the last parcel in 1936. It kept no books,
had no bank account and owned no other assets.
Although the corporation initially reported the sales of the prop-
erty on its income tax returns, Thompson filed a claim for refund on
the corporation's behalf and reported the gain on his individual return.
The issue, simply stated, was whether the gain from the sales was
income taxable to the corporation or taxable to Thompson. Implicit
in this inquiry was the fundamental issue of whether the corporate
36. 319 U.S. at 436; accord, National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S.
422 (1949); Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828
(1963); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Harrison Property
Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. CL. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130
(1974) ; Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969). But see Commissioner
v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961);
Industrial Union Oil Co., S CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 879 (1946).
37. See generally Kurtz & Kopp, supra .note 7, at 649. But see Case, supra
note 32, at 428.
38. John A. Mulligan, 16 T.C. 1489 (1951); Estate of L.B. Whitfield, 14 T.C.
776 (1950); Dallas Downtown Dev. Co., 12 T.C. 114 (1949).
[VOL. 20 : p. 7Z35
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entity should be disregarded. The Board of Tax Appeals resolved
the question in favor of the corporation, holding that it was a mere
agent whose corporate existence should be disregarded for tax pur-
poses. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the
basis that once the corporation was formed by Thompson - regardless
of motive - it must be recognized as a separate taxable entity.
40
In oral argument before the United States Supreme Court, the cor-
poration maintained that it was the mere agent or fiduciary of Thomp-
son, its creator. Therefore, it concluded that the gain from the sales
must be Thompson's, not its own. Conversely, the Commissioner
argued that a court can never disregard the corporate entity at the
request of the taxpayer.41 The Court, although finding for the Com-
missioner, rejected its absolute theory and instead based its decision on
the theory that a corporation should be recognized as a separate entity
for tax purposes when the purpose for which it was created is the
equivalent of business activity or when it subsequently engages in busi-
ness activity.42 The Court expressed the rule as follows:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a, useful purpose in busi-
ness life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the
demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undis-
closed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.4"
In refusing to disregard the corporate entity, the Court noted that when
a taxpayer adopts the corporate form for his own purposes and accepts
the advantages of such a business entity, he must also accept the tax
disadvantages. 4' This particular corporation had been created by
Thompson for his own advantage and had a special function from its
39. Moline Properties, Inc., 45 B.T.A. 647 (1941).
40. Commissioner v. Moline Properties, Inc., 131 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1942).
41. It had been the Commissioner's traditional position that, as a general rule,
any wholly owned corporate entity might be disregarded by the IRS in furtherance
of its revenue collection function, but that it could never be disregarded by its creators
to reduce or avoid tax. Case, supra note 32, at 419 n.78.
42. 319 U.S. at 438-39.
43. Id. (footnotes omitted); accord, Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455
(1st Cir. 1971) ; Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
828 (1963); Hagist Ranch, Inc. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961);
Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957)'; Payrmer v. Commissioner,
150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969);
Perry R. Bass 50 T.C. 595 (1968). See also National Carbide Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Harrison; Propertyf Mgmt. Co. v. United States,
475 F.2d 623 (Ct. C1. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
44. 319 U.S. at 439. . . I
1974-1975]
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inception. At the time of its formation, the corporation was clearly.
not the taxpayer's alter ego in that it had been dominated and con-,
trolled by the members of the voting trust which had interests anti-
thetical to those of the t~xpayer. At that time the corporation had been
a separate entity just as. though its outstanding stock had been owned
by third parties.
In an attempt to require the Commissioner to disregard the cor-
porate entity, the taxpayer had offered the alternative argument that the
corporation was a mere agent for its sole shareholder. The Court,
however, refused to accept, this argument, pointing out that there was
no contract of agency and that the usual incidents of an agency rela-
tionship were not present 4 Unfortunately, the Court did not detail
what might compose the usual incidents of an agency relationship. The
Court did maintain, however, that the mere existence of a close corpor-
ation would not make the corporation the agent of its stockholders. The
Court concluded that the issue of agency depended upon the same legal
principles as did the question of corporate identity.46 Presumably,
therefore, when the purpose for which the corporation is created is the
equivalent of business activity,' or when the corporation subsequently
engages in business activity'on its own accord, .it is not the agent of
its sole shareholder.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Moline Court did not
completely foreclose the possibility that a straw corporation would be
disregarded in certain circumstances. Unfortunately, however, the
Court did not give any concrete suggestion of what those circumstances
might be. The Court was satisfied merely to assert that the corporate
form might be disregarded when it is a sham or a fiction.47 The result
of this indefiniteness has been a series of cases in which courts have
attempted to specify those appropriate circumstances to which Moline
had alluded. It should also be noted that implicit in the Court's opinion
was the proposition that in certain instances, a corporation could be an
agent for its stockholders or other parties. Again, however, the Court
failed to provide specific examples of those necessary circumstances,
other than to intimate that the "usual incidents of an agency rela-
tionship," whatever they might be, and a contract of agency, must
be present.
48
45. Id. at 440.
46. Id. at 440-41.
47. Id. at 439.
48. Id. at 440. See text accompanying notes 79-106 infra; cf. Carver v. United
States, 412 F.2d 233, 239-40 (Ct. Cl. 1969), where the; court found that a true
agency or trusteeship existed when a wholly owned corporation acted on behalf of
an independent third party in the same way as it did for its owner. 10
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C. Evolution and Application of the Moline Test
Consideration of the application of the Moline test raises several
preliminary questions. The first and most obvious problem is the mean-
ing of "business activity." Shortly after the Moline decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced that question. 9 In
defining "business activity," Judge Learned Hand added the following
gloss to the Moline rule:
[T]o be a separate jural person for purposes of taxation, a cor-
poration must engage in some industrial, commercial, or other
activity besides avoiding taxation: in other words . . . the term
"corporation" will be interpreted to mean a corporation which
does some "business" in the ordinary meaning; and . . . escaping
taxation is not "business" in the ordinary meaning.50
Thus, it should be concluded that the corporation must actually do
something in order to be engaged in business activity. A mere passive
existence, even if its purpose is to hold title to property, is insufficient.
Another question is whether the first prong of the Moline rule is
worthy of literal application. On its face, the test directs that if a
corporation is created for a purpose which is the equivalent of business
activity, that corporation is to be considered a separate taxable entity,
even if the corporation does not engage in any business activity.
Although this position appears questionable, the Second Circuit, in
Jackson v. Commissioner,"' has indicated that the test should be
literally applied.
In Jackson, the court reiterated that a corporation may not be
disregarded for tax purposes if one of the shareholders' intentions in
creating it was that the corporation itself should have a substantial
business function.52 The court emphasized that it is the intended busi-
ness function of the corporation itself and not the incorporator's reason
for incorporating which is determinative.13 Nevertheless, based on the
facts of the case, the court applied the second prong of the Moline rule
and 'held that the corporate entities involved should be disregarded
49. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
50. Id. at 468.
51. 233 F.2d 289, 290 (2d Cir. 1956); accord, Carver v. United States, 412
F.2d 233, 236 (Ct. Cl. 1969); cf. Caswal Corp., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 757 (1960).
But see Kronovet, supra note 11, at 59, where the author maintains that corpora-
tions which engage in a single activity over a minimal time period have not been
challenged by the Commissioner.
52. 233 F.2d at 290.
53. Id. But see Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 828 (1963). See also Perry R. Bass, 50 T.C. 595, 601 (1968).
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since they engaged in only negligible business activities. 4 Implicit in
this holding is the conclusion that the corporations were not created
for the purpose of exercising any substantial business function.
It would appear that, based on the facts, the holding in Jackson
is correct. However, the implication of Jackson that any corporation
should be treated as a taxable entity merely because it can be proven
that it was created for the purpose of performing a substantial business
function would seem to impair the power of the IRS to disregard
the corporation. An examination of the cases indicates otherwise. It
is submitted that formation for a business purpose combined with
minimal, rather than substantial, activity will result in the disregard
of the corporation for tax purposes. 5 Most courts, when considering
this question, primarily direct their attention to whether the corpora-
tion has engaged in any substantial business activity.56 In fact, it may
be presumed that unless a corporation engages in more than a single
activity over a period of time, the straw status of a corporation will
not be challenged, regardless of the purposes for which it was created.57
This conclusion is further supported by the many cases in which
it has been held that the mere fact that a corporation is regarded by its
owners as a "dummy," a "straw," or a "phantom" bears no weight.5 8
In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that although most corpora-
tions owned by sole shareholders are "dummies" in the sense that the
determination of their policies and day-to-day activities are decisions
of the individual stockholders and not corporate decisions, that single
fact is meaningless for disposition of the tax issue."9
This attitude is reflected in the case of Love v. United States,6"
where the taxpayers were members of a partnership or joint venture
whose primary business concern was the operation and sale of real
54. Two corporations, Dumelle and Belgrade, were owned and controlled by
the individual taxpayers. Dumelle's only activity was the receipt of stock from a
corporation in which the taxpayers owned a one-third interest. Thereafter, Dumelle
purported to sell the stock to Belgrade which exchanged the shares for stock in a
fourth corporation. Belgrade continued merely to hold the stock in the fourth cor-
poration. 233 F.2d at 289-90.
55. See, e.g., Sam Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
56. See cases cited in note 58 infra.
57. See David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760 (1973) ; Shaw Constr. Co., 35 T.C. 1102,
1166 (1961); Kronovet, supra note 11, at 59.
58. See, e.g., Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623
(Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) ; Carver v. United States, 412
F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Love v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 919 (Ct Cl. 1951).
See also National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Skarda v.
Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957); Perry R. Bass, 50 T.C. 595 (1968);
John F. Nutt, 39 T.C. 231 (1962).
59. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
60. 96 F. Supp. 919 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
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property. Legal title to the venture's income-producing property was
held by the Leado Investment Company (Leado), a corporation owned
by the taxpayers. The Commissioner proposed deficiency assessments
against the corporation on the grounds that certain income reported
by the individual taxpayers should have been reported as corporate
income, and that the individuals should have treated their income as
dividends. The taxpayers maintained that Leado was merely a dummy
or phantom corporation used to hold legal title to the property conveni-
ently, and that it had never engaged in active operations. The Com-
missioner argued that the corporation's business activities were sum-
cient to require it to be recognized as a separate taxable entity.6 '
Leado held legal title to approximately 100 parcels of real estate, the
annual income from which exceeded $50,000. The income did not flow
through the corporation, but was collected and disbursed by an agent
of the interested parties. The court noted, however, that any of the
interested parties could have insisted that the money flow through the
corporation and be distributed by it rather than by the agent. 2 The
corporation, acting through its officers, executed leases and deeds of
trust, entered into agreements to sell, purchased and held insurance
policies on the property, sued and was sued in its corporate name on
matters involving the property, employed at least 10 employees, and
paid the applicable payroll taxes. The fact that the corporation was
used for so many business purposes and was available at all times for
such use precluded the court from finding that it was a mere phantom
organization. Noting that the parties could have elected to conduct
their business in other ways, but had elected to utilize the corporate
form as insulation against potential personal liability, the court con-
cluded that the taxpayers could not avoid the resulting tax conse-
quences. The court stated:
That a corporation is regarded as a "straw," a "dummy," a
"phantom," in itself proves nothing. The concept of the corpora-
tion is itself a fiction. A corporation is an artificial person. It
operates under a charter granted it by the state, conferring certain
rights, and also conferring certain privileges and exemptions in
return for complying with certain rules or conditions. The de-
cision to recognize or not to recognize the tax identity of a cor-
poration depends upon what the corporation does, not what it is
called, how many or how few own it, or how they regard it.
Whether much or little use was made by plaintiffs of the Leado
corporation, it was available to them at all times, like the musket
61. Id. at 920.
62. Id. at 922.
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behind the door, for use when needed or when occasion should
arise. We hold that they did in fact use it to such an extent that
its separate identity must be recognized.1
3
Thus, if a corporation engages in some business activity in the ordi-
narily accepted meaning of that term, it will be recognized as a tax-
able entity separate and distinct from its creators. Although the propo-
sition is not entirely free from doubt, 4 recent caselaw indicates that
the quantum of business activity is not determinative. Therefore, it
is safe to conclude that the business activity sufficient to permit the
Commissioner to recognize a corporation as a separate taxable entity
may be minimal."'
Certain functions may exist which, though performed in the
normal course of a corporation's business, are not deemed to be business
activities. For example, many courts have held that tax avoidance is
not a business activity. 6 Furthermore, since straw corporations are
often formed for the sole purpose of holding title to real property such
corporations, by necessity, are required to perform certain ministerial
acts involving the receipt and transfer of title. Such corporations might
also be required to perform similar activities in connection with in-
come from the property. However, it is precisely the latter types of
transactions which often form the basis for a determination that the
corporation is no longer the alter ego of its creators but is a viable
and taxable entity. Nevertheless, the mere execution of documents of
title and related papers should not deny the corporation its straw status,
so long as it makes no contrary representations to outsiders in such
transactions.0 7 However, extreme caution should be taken in such
situations to ensure that the corporation remains merely a straw and
does not participate in its own right in any negotiations or other
activities, since those actions are sufficient cause to treat the corpora-
tion as a taxable entity.
63. Id.
64. Compare Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970) and Herbert
v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952) with Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 (1963) ; Hagist Ranch, Inc. v. Commissioner,
295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961) and Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir.
1957). See also David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760, 766 (1973).
65. See Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 1970); Herbert v.
Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See also Paymer v. Commissioner 150
F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949):
National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Lloyd F. Noonan,
52 T.C. 907 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1971).
67. See Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971) (dictum).
See also Watts, supra note 24, at 877. But see Kronovet, supra note 11, at 55.
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This reasoning has been developed in a line of cases involving real
estate holding companies which held record title to real estate, bene-
ficial ownership of which remained in certain individuals pursuant to
written agreement. In Stewart Forshay,68 the first of these cases, cer-
tain real property was transferred by three individuals to a corporation
organized to hold title for their benefit. The individuals entered into
a written agreement which specifically provided that the corporation
existed solely to hold record title. Thereafter, the property was sold
at a gain. The Board of Tax Appeals determined that although record
title was held by the corporation, both legal and equitable title was
retained by the individuals. Therefore, the gain from the sale was
taxable to them instead of the corporation. The Board held that since
the corporation did not engage in business, hold directors' meetings,
declare dividends, or perform acts other than the execution of deeds,
as the record title holder, it should be disregarded for tax purposes.
Thus, the Moline test as evolved can be summarized as follows:
where a corporation engages in business activity, in the ordinary mean-
ing of that term, even if such activity is minimal, its corporate existence
will not be disregarded for tax purposes unless its sole activity con-
sists of those ministerial tasks necessary to receive and transfer title.
Although this test is easily stated, its application is extremely
difficult. 9 The fine line separating corporate recognition from cor-
porate disregard is very tenuous. This is illustrated by the Second
Circuit's resolution of the problem in Paymer v. Commissioner,°
where the corporate status of one close corporation was disregarded
while a second member of the same corporate family was held to be
a separate taxable entity.
In Paymer, one of two brothers, who were business partners, had
personally guaranteed the payment of a substantial matured debt. In
an attempt to thwart the attachment of any partnership property in
satisfaction of the personal debt, the partners formed two corporations,
Raymep Realty (Raymep) and Westrich Realty (Westrich). Both
corporations were given broad powers in their articles of incorporation
to own, manage, and dispose of real property. The partnership con-
68. 20 B.T.A. 537 (1930). See also Industrial Union Oil Co., 5 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 879 (1946). Moro Realty Holding Corp., 25 B.T.A. 1135 (1932).
69. Compare K-C Land Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 183 (1960) with Tomlinson
v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 (1963). Also compare
Alan S. Davis, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 749 (1970) and Lloyd F. Noonan, 52 T.C. 907
(1969), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1971) with Perry R. Bass, 50 T.C.
595 (1968).
70. 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945) criticized in Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 11, at
651-52. See also Raymep Realty Corp., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 262 (1948).
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veyed a parcel of income-producing property to each corporation for
which each partner received one-half of the stock. The corporations'
minutes provided that the conveyance was made with the express
understanding that the corporation was only to hold title to the prop-
erty and that the beneficial interest, profits and the exclusive right to
manage and control the property were to be retained by the partners. The
minutes also provided that the corporations were organized solely for
the convenience of the shareholders in the management of the property.
The two partners managed the property, collected the income,
paid the expenses, deposited the cash receipts in the partnership bank
account, and used the net proceeds for their own purposes, treating the
property exactly the same as they had when it had been partnership
property. The existing leases on the properties were not assigned to
either corporation. Westrich did nothing with respect to the property
held in its name. The only activity Raymep engaged in was to secure
a $50,000 loan - the security consisting of an assignment to the
lender of all the corporation's rights, profits and interests in the two
leases on the property to which it held title. Raymep also covenanted
that the leases were in full force and effect and that it was the sole
lessor. During 1938, the partners received approximately $19,000
in gross rental income from the property to which Raymep held title
and $3,300 from the property to which Westrich held title.
In drawing a fine line between the activities of the two corpora-
tions the Second Circuit, applying the Moline test, stated:
We think that Raymep was active enough to justify holding
that it did engage in business in 1938. The absence of books,
records and offices and the failure to hold corporate meetings are
not decisive on that question. Though Raymep was organized
solely to deter creditors of one of the partners, it apparently was
impossible or impractical to use it solely for that purpose when it
became necessary or desirable to secure the above mentioned loan
in a substantial amount. ...
Westrich, however, was at all times .but a passive dummy
which did nothing but take and hold the title to the real estate
conveyed to it. It served no business purpose in connection with
the property and was intended to serve only as a blind to deter the
creditors of one of the partners. It was but a sham to be disre-
garded for tax purposes.71
In so holding, the court apparently attached little or no significance to
the corporate resolutions which had declared that the corporations had
71. 150 F.2d at 336-37 (2d Cir. 1945).
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no beneficial interest in the properties. With the possible exception of
Raymep's declaration that it was the sole lessor at the time it obtained
the loan, it would appear that the corporation did no more than per-
form those ministerial acts72 inherent to a straw corporation which
have been held not to constitute business activity. Thus, the distinction
drawn by the Paymer court is questionable. However, it is illustrative
of the problems encountered in this area by courts applying the Moline
test. It is also an example of the strict application of the principle that
a corporation holding title to property is treated as a taxable entity if
it engages in any significant nontax activity with respect to the prop-
erty it holds.
A second example of the potential danger permeating this area is
the recent Tax Court decision in David F. Bolger.7" Bolger concerned
the typical 1-day real estate transaction for which most practitioners
would expect the corporate entities to be disregarded. 74 However, the
decision in Bolger that the corporations were taxable entities mandates
a reexamination of that expectation.
In Bolger the taxpayer formed 10 financing corporations, each
with an initial capitalization of $1,000. The stockholders were the
same individuals who would ultimately take title to the property. After
formation, the corporations purchased buildings which other enterprises
desired to lease, although occasionally, the seller would also become
the lessee. Usually, each particular transaction was completed in 1 day:
the seller conveyed the property to the financing corporation and the
financing corporation leased it to the user; the financing corporation
then sold its negotiable interest-bearing corporate notes, in an amount
equal to the purchase price, to institutional lenders pursuant to a note
purchase agreement. The notes were secured by a first mortgage ol
the properties and by an assignment of the lease. Following the com-
pletion of these transactions, the financing corporation conveyed its
property to its shareholders subject to the lease and mortgage. At that
time, the shareholders assumed the financing corporation's obligations
under the lease and mortgage except that they assumed no personal
financial obligation for the mortgage payments. Liability on the
assumption was thus limited to the transferred property. The cor-
porations agreed to continue in existence and to refrain from any busi-
ness activity not associated with the ownership and leasing of the
property. Rental payments in an amount equal to the mortgage pay-
72. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
73. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
74. See Kronovet, supra note 11, at 54.
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ments were made directly to the mortgagee, and the financing corpora-
tion only kept the additional portion of the rent.
The ultimate issue before the Tax Court was whether the share-
holders were the owners of the property and entitled to the depreciation
deductions thereon. Even though the matter was not decisive, the
court went to great lengths to determine that the corporations were
separate entities for tax purposes, both before and after the transfer
of the properties to the shareholders, although the taxpayers prevailed
on the depreciation issue.
Applying the Moline test, the B'olger court found that the cor-
porations had initially engaged in substantial business activities and
were viable entities whose separate existence could not be ignored for
tax purposes. 75  The court determined that the corporations were
formed for three business purposes: to enable the transactions to pro-
duce maximum financing by avoiding state restrictions on loans to
individuals, to limit personal liability, and to facilitate multiple-lender
financing. 76 To accomplish these purposes the corporations purchased
and leased property, issued corporate obligations and executed mort-
gages.77 The court also held that the corporations should be recog-
nized as separate entities even after they transferred their properties
and contracted to refrain from engaging in any other business activity.
The court based this determination on the facts that the corporations
remained liable on the mortgages, had contracted to remain in exist-
ence and had promised to preserve their powers to own property and
to engage in business.
78
IV. THE NOMINEE CORPORATION
A. Preliminary Considerations
The second major device for accomplishing taxpayers' business
objectives without causing adverse tax consequences is the corporate
nominee. Such corporations freely admit their separate existence,
yet maintain that they are either agents or trustees of the beneficial
75. 59 T.C. at 766. The Tax Court distinguished Jackson v. Commissioner,
233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956), O'Neill v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1948)
and Dallas Downtown Dev. Co., 12 T.C. 114 (1949), on the basis of the quantum of
activity, noting that the activities conducted by the corporations in Bolger were
far greater.
76. 59 T.C. at 766.
77. Id. Although in some of the transactions there were words in the pertinent
documents connoting nominee rather than straw status the court rejected the tax-
payer's argument that the corporations were mere agents or nominees, primarily on
the authority of National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). See
text accompanying notes 86-106 infra.
78. 59 T.C. at 767.
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owners of the property. The critical question in disputes involving the
validity of corporate nominee status is not whether the corporation is
engaged in business activity, but rather whether it is acting in its own
behalf or as an agent or trustee for the beneficial owners of the income-
producing property.
As previously noted,7" the Moline Court suggested that under
certain unarticulated circumstances a corporation could be an agent of
its stockholders or other parties. The Court merely stated that the
prerequisite for such status was the existence of the "usual incidents of
an agency relationship."8 0 This dicta foreshadowed the result reached
by the Court six years later in National Carbide Corp. v. Commis-
sioner.8 1 However, even before the National Carbide decision, the
Tax Court had held that a corporation could function as the trustee
or agent of its principal.8 2 A review of the approach taken by the Tax
Court prior to the National Carbide decision provides helpful insights
into the 'background of that case.
For example, in Worth Steamship Corporation,"3 two of three
participants in a joint venture operated a steamship for the joint ven-
ture's account at a monthly fee. The two individuals organized a steam-
ship corporation of which they were sole shareholders for this purpose.
The corporation received the monthly management fee which it re-
ported as taxable income. Record title to the ship was transferred to
the corporation with the understanding that it was merely to operate
the vessel, collect the income, pay the expenses, and transmit the excess
to the three joint venturers who had retained the beneficial ownership
of the vessel. All the business transactions were carried out in accord-
ance with the terms of a written joint venture agreement, an operating
agreement, and a declaration of trust. The Tax Court agreed with the
taxpayers that the basic test to determine who was responsible for the
tax was one of ownership. The court held that the corporation was an
agent of the joint venture, and, except for the monthly management fee,
was not the owner of, and was not taxable on, the income generated by
the use of the ship.
In light of other authority, the ownership test applied by the Tax
Court is somewhat suspect.84 Nevertheless, the case illustrates three
79. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
80. 319 U.S. at 440.
81. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
82. Worth Steamship Corp., 7 T.C. 654 (1946); Industrial Union Oil Co., 5
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 879 (1946).
83. 7 T.C. 654 (1946).
84. See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 -U.S. 436 (1943); Harrison Property Mgmt.
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recurring factors in cases in which taxpayers prove the existence of a
corporate agency or trust: existence of written agency or trust agree-
ments, scrupulous adherence to the terms of those agreements, and the
lack of absolute identity between the corporate shareholders and the
beneficial owners of the income-producing property. Although the
existence of these three factors does not guarantee judicial recognition
of a corporate nominee, their absence substantially reduces the likeli-
hood of such recognition.8 5
B. National Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner
In National Carbide, three wholly owned subsidiaries of Airco
contended that they were corporate agents of the parent. Their written
contracts with Airco, with which they operated in strict accordance,
provided that the subsidiaries were employed as agents to manage and
operate certain production plants and to sell the output for their prin-
cipal. Airco agreed to furnish working capital, executive management
and office facilities. The subsidiaries agreed to pay Airco all profits in
excess of 6 percent on their nominal outstanding capital stock. The
subsidiaries held title to their assets and the amounts advanced by
Airco for working capital were carried on the subsidiaries' books as
accounts payable. The chief officers of Airco were also officers of the
subsidiaries. The directors of the subsidiaries met only to ratify the
actions of Airco's top management. Airco treated the profits from the
subsidiaries as its own income and reported it as such for tax pur-
poses, whereas the subsidiaries reported only the 6-percent return on
their capital. The Commissioner proposed that the subsidiaries were
taxable on all the income from their operations.
The issue, as phrased by the Supreme Court, was whether the
"usual incidents of an agency relationship," mentioned by the Moline
Court, were present."" Accepting the rule of Moline, the Court noted
that "[o]wnership of a corporation and the control incident thereto
can have no different tax consequences when clothed in the garb of
agency than when worn as a removable corporate veil."8" The Court
found no distinction between the control exercised by Airco over the
three subsidiaries and that exercised by the sole stockholder in Moline.
Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. C1. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
But see Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961).
85. Compare Greer v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1964) and Given
v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956) with Caswal Corp., 19 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 757 (1960) and K-C Land Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 183 (1960).
86. 336 U.S. at 427 (1949).
87. Id. at 430.
[VOL. 20 : p. 735
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss3/1
STRAW CORPORATION TAX PROBLEMS
The Court held that no agency relationship existed because the sub-
sidiaries' earnings were turned over to Airco, which owned and com-
pletely dominated the subsidiaries88 - a result which would not have
been possible if the subsidiaries had been owned by third parties. The
Court also emphasized that all the subsidiaries' assets had been trans-
ferred to them by the parent, and that no real consideration had passed
from the subsidiaries to Airco in return for these assets . 9 Neverthe-
less, the Court suggested the scope of its decision:
What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate agent
or trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-
principal without being taxable therefor. Whether the corporation
operates in the name and for the account of the principal, binds
the principal by its actions, transmits money received to the prin-
cipal, and whether receipt of income is attributable to the services
of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the princi-
pal are some of the relevant considerations in determining whether
a true agency exists. If the corporation is a true agent, its rela-
tions with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that
it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business pur-
pose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent. 0
Thus, the National Carbide decision details some of the charac-
teristics of the true corporate nominee. The nominee corporation must
operate in the name of, and for the account of its principal; it must
have the power to bind the principal by its actions; money received by
it must be transmitted to its principal; the principals must not be the
owners of the corporation; and the agency relationship must be the
result of an arm's length transaction and not the shareholders' owner-
ship of the purported agent. However, these attributes are merely de-
scriptive and were not intended as an all-inclusive guide. The import-
ance of a written agreement setting forth the details of the relationship
between the principal and the corporate agent,91 as well as the scrupul-
88. Id. at 438.
89. Id. at 434-35.
90. Id. at 437 (footnotes omitted) ; accord, Greer v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 20
(5th Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir.
1956); Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961) ; Natalie-Sas Jaworsky, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 630
(1965), aff'd per curiarn, 379 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Emzy Z. Baker, 22 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1649 (1963); John F. Nutt, 39 T.C. 231 (1962). Cf. Carver v.
United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ; K-C Land Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
879 (1960); Casual Corp., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 757 (1960). See also Worth
S.S. Corp., 7 T.C. 654 (1946); Industrial Union Oil Co., 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
879 (1946).
91. See, e.g., Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956), in which the
absence of an agency agreement or trust instrument negated taxpayer's argument
that the corporation was a mere agent of the shareholders.
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ous adherence to these details cannot be overemphasized. However,
the mere presence of a properly drafted agency agreement is insufficient;
the written agreement must be based on an authentic agency relation-
ship, since the Court stressed that the "usual incidents of an agency
relationship" are not satisfied by the identity of ownership and control
disclosed by the facts in National Carbide.9"
C. Application of the National Carbide Test
The case of Given v. Commissioner provides a prime example of
a procedure guaranteed to be regarded by the IRS and the courts as
not constituting a creation of a corporate nominee. In Given, five
individual associates in the purchase, repair, operation, and profitable
sale of a commercial building, utilized an existing corporation in order
to avoid the complications of death, litigation, and other hazards of
personal ownership. Each associate contributed a proportionate share
of the needed cash into the corporate treasury, each receiving one-fifth
of the corporate stock in return. The corporation then assumed the
obligation for the balance of the purchase price by executing the neces-
sary notes and mortgage. No other agreements were executed among
the individuals or with the corporation establishing any trust or agency
relationship. The corporation, after leasing the building to various
tenants, made the necessary repairs and improvements to the building
and was reimbursed by the individual associates. Three of the asso-
ciates terminated their interest in the venture by transferring their
stock to the two who remained. Thereafter, the corporation executed
the necessary instruments to sell the building.
The Commissioner proposed a tax at the corporate level on the
rental income and the proceeds of the sale. The taxpayers, liable for
the corporate tax as transferees of its corporate assets, insisted that the
income was received by the corporation as their agent and not in its
own right. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this
theory on the authority of Moline and National Carbide, holding that
the corporation had engaged in substantial business activities in its
own behalf.94 The court emphasized the fact that the individuals had
entered into no agreements with the corporation or each other estab-
lishing any status, relationship, or right in the property other than that
inherent in their capacity as stockholders. There was no foundation
92. 336 U.S. at 439. See generally Rev. Rut. 59-247, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 14, in
which the IRS proposes its method for establishing a corporate agency relationship,
although reserving the right to reallocate the combined income of the corporate
group annually, if the yearly factual situation so warrants.
93. 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956).
94. Id. at 583.
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for the claim that the corporation was an agent, conduit, or other
straw; therefore, it had no basis for escaping tax liability.95
The outcome of this case might have been different had the in-
dividuals given more attention to the details of the transaction. It is
conceivable that if the parties had entered into a specific contract of
agency with the corporation, adhered closely to its terms, provided for
payment to the corporation of a reasonable management fee, and not
maintained identity of corporate ownership, the resulting tax conse-
quences would have been quite different.
Yet it is possible that a corporation can attain nominee or agency
status within the scope of the National Carbide test. For example, in
K-C Land Co.,96 a corporation contended that it was merely a title-
holding entity and that a deficiency assessed against it was computed
on income from the purchases and sales of land, an oil and gas lease,
and corporate stock, all of which belonged beneficially to others. The
stock of the corporation had been issued to three individuals, although
no money had been paid to the corporation. The properties involved,
some of which were income-producing, had been acquired by the cor-
poration at various times. Upon each acquisition, the corporation
agreed with the joint venturers that it had no beneficial interest in the
property and that it held record title only as trustee for the joint ven-
ture. The parties involved - the three stockholders, other individuals
who did not own stock in the petitioner corporation, and another cor-
poration - executed a joint venture agreement which provided that
the profits and losses were to be shared equally, that all proceeds should
first be applied to payment of costs and expenses, and thereafter, be
divided in accordance with the profit-sharing ratio, that the proceeds
should be transferred to the corporation solely for convenience and
management purposes, and finally that taxes and other expenses should
be paid by the corporation only for operational convenience. The par-
ties also executed a management agreement which provided that the
corporation was to retain possession of the property, and operate and
manage it for the joint venturers at their direction and control. The
corporation performed no*managerial functions and received no man-
agerial fees.
The Commissioner argued that the corporation was organized for
a business purpose and had engaged in substantial 'business activities.
95. Id.
96. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 183 (1960); accord, Caswal Corp., 19 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 757 (1960). The current status of K-C Land is questionable since it relied,
in part, upon State-Adams Corp., 32 T.C. 365 (1959), which was reversed on appeal,
283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961). See also Kronovet,
supra note 11, at 56, where it is suggested that neither K-C Land nor Caswal Corp.
can be relied upon today.
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It was the Commissioner's position that the corporation had been
created to provide central control for various transactions and had en-
gaged in substantial business activities in furtherance of that purpose.
In rejecting the Commissioner's contentions, the court held that
the net profits distributed to the joint venturers were not corporate
distributions to shareholders. The court emphasized that the corporate
shareholders and the joint venturers were not identical, and asserted
that the joint venturers did not intend to do business as a corporation.
The court concluded that the corporation held title to the property in
trust, had no beneficial interest in the properties, and did not engage
in substantial business activities. Therefore, the income derived from
the properties belonged to the joint venture and was not taxable to the
petitioner corporation.
97
A recent and informative application of the National Carbide
rationale is the decision in Harrison Property Management Co. v.
United States.98 The critical issue was whether profits derived from
oil leases, the record title to which was held by the management cor-
poration, were taxable to that corporation, or to the beneficial owners
who had transferred record title to the corporation of which they were
the sole incorporators, stockholders, officers and directors. 9 The cor-
poration had been formed for the express purpose of providing efficient
management if any one of the individuals died. The corporate charter
strictly limited the rights, powers, and authority of the corporation to
conduct business affecting the property. The property was transferred
to the corporation solely for the purpose of management and adminis-
tration. The individuals executed an agreement with the corporation
whereby the transfer was made "solely and only as a matter of conveni-
ence and accommodation and without consideration whatsoever. 100
The agreement identified the individuals as the beneficial owners of the
property and provided that the corporation disclaimed any right, title,
or interest in the property other than the right to manage and adminis-
ter it. The corporation complied with the terms of the agreement,
deducting from corporate income all expenses and crediting the balance
in appropriate proportions to the accounts of the individuals.
The Court of Claims initially analyzed the facts without consider-
ing the contract of agency and concluded that, if the contract was not
capable of recognition for tax purposes, the corporation was a taxable
entity. The paramount principle was that the stockholders of a closely
97. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. at 187.
98. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. C1. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974), discussed in
Kronovet, supra note 11, at 54-55.
99. 475 F.2d at 624.
100. Id. at 625.
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held corporation could not demand that their corporation be ignored
for federal income tax purposes.
Where individuals adopt the corporate form for purposes of their
own, the choice of the advantages of incorporation to do business
requires "the acceptance of the tax disadvantages." It is imma-
terial that the shareholders remain the beneficial owners of the
property transferred to the company, or that the latter's policies
and day-to-day activities are determined, not as decisions of the
corporation, but by the owners acting individually. . . . The con-
trolling tests, ignoring the fact that the corporation is substantially
the alter ego of the stockholders, concentrate on the reasons why
the "dummy" was created, and what it actually does.''
In applying these tests, the court found that the corporation had been
formed for acceptable business purposes and that the corporation had
performed those business functions. The court concluded, therefore,
that the corporation had been neither dormant nor inert.' 2
The court next considered the taxpayers' major argument that the
agency agreement brought the matter within the exception recognized
by the Supreme Court in National Carbide. However, the court held
that National Carbide did not make the formal designation of a docu-
ment as an "agency agreement" a conclusive factor. The significant
criteria were
whether the so-called 'agent' would have made the agreement if
the so-called 'principals' were not its owners, and conversely
whether the 'principals' would have undertaken the arrangement
if the 'agent' were not their corporate creature.1
0 3
The court reasoned that it would be inconceivable that a corporation
would have entered into the alleged agency contract with property
owners who were not shareholders or that the shareholders would have
agreed to such an arrangement with the corporation if they had con-
trolled it. The efficacy of the corporation's relations with the beneficial
owners of the managed property depended on their position as the
sole shareholders. The court concluded that the corporation was, in
fact, a taxable entity, and not a mere agent of the shareholders.1 4
The Harrison Court stated that the Moline-National Carbide tests
defining the taxability of close corporations cannot be circumvented by
a simple agency agreement device if the actual operations of the cor-
poration indicate otherwise. Rather, the National Carbide Court, which
had previously disposed of that postulate, required a more substantial
101. Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 626-27.
103. Id. at 627.
104. Id. at 629.
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showing that the connection between the self-designated principal and
agent was independent of the principal's ownership and control of
the agent. 0
In closing, the court rendered a telling observation on the signifi-
cance of adherence to the National Carbide test in cases involving small,
closely held corporations:
In Subchapter S, sections 1371-1379 of the 1954 Code, Congress
has provided, in defined circumstances, for the treatment of such
companies as partnerships, with the stockholders rather than the
corporation paying the income tax on the profits. It appears
highly probable that [the corporation in this case], though a small
business corporation, could not qualify for Subchapter S benefits
because more than 20 percent of its receipts in the taxable years
was "passive investment income" from rents - a specific excep-
tion contained in Section 1372(e) (5). This limitation is still an
integral part of the Congressional design for lifting the tax from
the corporation - an existing legislative restriction which would
be thwarted if non-eligible companies could attain the same result
by the simple procedure of a surfacial "principal" - "agent"
agreement which is not in essence divorced from the owner-cor-
poration relationship.0 6
At first glance, the holding in Harrison might be considered
indicative of a judicial trend toward strict limitation on the use of a
nominee corporation. However, closer analysis reveals that it is merely
a literal and balanced application of the National Carbide test. The
critical flaw which prevented the taxpayers in Harrison from achieving
the desired tax treatment was the identity of interests between the share-
holders who dominated and controlled the corporation while retaining
beneficial ownership of the income-producing property. Conceivably,
had this identity of interest been severed through the use of a separate
corporate agent owned and controlled by unrelated third parties, the
result might have been different. On the other hand, the court sug-
gested that if the corporation had been controlled by unrelated third
parties the taxpayers might not have been able to achieve their desired
business objectives.
V. ,SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
It has been shown that a corporation, created for business pur-
poses, or thereafter engaging in business activities in the ordinary
meaning of that term, is to be regarded as a separate taxable entity.0 7
105. Id. at 628.
106. Id. at 629-30 (footnote omitted).
107. See text accompanying notes 39-48 supra.
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The conduct necessary to constitute sufficient business activity in order
to compel recognition of the corporation as a separate entity has not
been expressly delineated. However, it can reasonably be concluded
that in most instances minimal business activity on the part of the
corporation is a sufficient basis to label it a taxable entity.108 The busi-
ness activity test has been applied quite literally and strictly by the
courts."0 9 Moreover, recent decisions have cast suspicion upon formerly
safe transactions involving straw corporations." Nevertheless, if a
corporation engages in no transactions in its own behalf and exhibits
only a passive existence, it has been treated as. a straw and thus has
escaped taxation at the corporate level."'
It has also been demonstrated that, under certain circumstances,
a corporate agent or trustee may hold, manage, or operate the property
of its principal without being subject to tax on the operating income.1
1 2
Although most of the factors have been exhibited in situations where
the taxpayer failed to prove an agency or trust relationship, the absence
of these factors will result in a decision adverse to the taxpayer. Thus,
although the presence of certain criteria will not guarantee a beneficial
result for the taxpayer, the cases indicate that the "usual incidents of
an agency relationship" must be present." 8 The corporate agent must
inter alia, operate in the name of the principal, have the power to bind
the principal by its action, and transmit all funds to the principal." 4
Moreover, the agency or trust relationship must result from an arm's
length transaction and must not depend upon the principal's ownership
or control of the corporate agent. The factor which the cases stress
most is the requirement of a lack of identity between the corporate
owners and the beneficial owners of the income-producing property.!"
In other words, the corporate shareholders should not be the beneficial
owners of the income-producing property, nor should they be subject
to the control, either direct or indirect, of the beneficial owners. Finally,
108. See, e.g., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970); Herbert v.
Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
109. See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
110. See, e.g., David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); cf. Harrison Property
Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1130 (1974).
111. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956). See also
text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 79-92 supra.
113. See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 427 (1949);
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
114. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949).
115. See, e.g., id. at 422; Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475
F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
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the terms of the agency or trust relationship must be in writing, and
the parties must strictly adhere to those terms.""
Not unexpectedly,- the' doctrine developed by Moline, National
Carbide, and their progeny has not escaped criticism. One approach
suggests that any corporation properly formed and in good standing
should be considered a taxable entity." 7 However, the question should
be what amount of the' income, if any, should be taxable to that entity.
If a properly structuled corporation states in its articles of incorpora-
ion that its specific purpose is to function as a straw or nominee, and
it scrupulously complies with this description in its business dealings,
any income generated by the :property to which it holds legal, but not
beneficial, title should be taxed to the true owner of the income-produc-
ing property. Any other income,, including fees or management charges,
would otherwise, of coufrse, be' taxable to the corporation' since it earned
that income. Any abuse'of such an arrangement could still be prevented
'by invoking the gendral doctrines of sham' corporation, reallocation of
income, and the attack on transactions lacking economic significance.
Although this approach achieves the desired result' by a less cir-
cuitous route - taxing income to the beneficial owner of the income-
producing property -' it has' not received judicial acceptance. The
courts continue to phrase the issue in terms of disregard of the cor-
porate entity, purpose 'of incorporation, and quantum of business
activities. Since the courts, :including the Supreme Court, have applied
the Moline and National Carbide tests for more than thirty years, it is
highly unlikely that they: would accept a surrogate at this late date.
Therefore, it is necessary to tailor the corporate vehicle' to satisfy
the prevailing tests.
It is submitted ' hat,' with' the exception of the true real estate
holding company, the, greatest risk is encountered when the taxpayer
attempts to comply 'withi the Moline test for straw corporations. In
those instances, minimal activity by the corporation - for example,
obtaining a loan or exect~ing a, lease or mortgage -- might be sufficient
to render the corporation a separate entity .forl tax purposes. On the
other hand, it has been suggested that the taxpayer has a better chance
of complying with the National Carbide test for nominee corporations,
although there' are contrary opinions.11 8
The foregoing idifficulties suggest that in order to 'secure certain
business objectives, straw or nominee corporation.s should be utilized
116. See, e.g., Given v.' Commispioner, 238 F.2d 579,'(8th Cir. 1956).
117. See, e.g., Kurtz & Kopp, supa note 7, at 656-57.
118. Compare id. at '657 '(taxpayer should be' successful 'in accomplishing business
objectives of a noinilee corporation without incurring adverse tax consequences) with
Kronovet, supra note 11, at 59-60 ;(the 'agency, appiroach involves 'too: many risks).
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only as .a last resort. The client should be.advised that the likelihood
is slight that either corporate form, might avoid the additional separate
tax burden. If-the decision is nonetheless made, to use one of these
corporate forms, .the. following recommendations should be carefully
considered. :9
The initial concern should be compliance with local requirements
concerning incorporation and related legal 'forihalities. It is also im-
portant that the corporation be adequately .finaiced for its intended
purpose. The articles of incorporatiofi, should, bL carefully drafted in
order to limit the corporate purposes arid .powersto either holding, or.
managing and operating property on behalfiof others and not on the
corporation's own behalf; Standard: boilerplate tclauses efiabling the
corporation to engage in any legal business activity should be avoided.
Appropriate agreements should be executed between the parties setting
forth the true status of the corporation and its relationship to the
beneficial owners of the property. Specific provisions in such agree-
ments should include: 1) that the corporation has no discretionary
authority to act without the express written direction of the beneficial
owners; 2) that the corporation will terminate the agency or straw
relationship upon notice from the beneficial owners and will retransfer
legal title to the property to such beneficial owners upon their notice
and demand; 3) that the corporation will receive an appropriate fee
for services rendered; 4) that all income generated by, and all expenses
incurred for the benefit of the property should be paid through the
beneficial owners' bank account; and 5) that the only funds deposited
into the corporation's account should be its own earned fees, and the
only checks drawn on the corporate account should be payment of those
non-reimbursable expenses incurred in performing these services.
The importance of the appropriate documents outlining the rela-
tionship between the corporation and the beneficial owners of the
property cannot be overemphasized. Their existence is critical for a
satisfactory resolution should any challenge be made by the federal
or state tax authorities. Directors' and shareholders' resolutions ex-
pressly detailing the corporation's passive role should be reflected in
the appropriate minutes prior to each transaction. All books, records,
statements, reports, and returns should evidence in meticulous detail
the relationship 'between the corporation and the beneficial owners,
stressing the fact that the latter are the true owners of the property.
The corporation's financial statements and tax returns should reflect
only the fees it receives for services rendered and the expenses incurred
119. See generally Kronovet, supra note 11, at 59-60; Kurtz & Kopp, supra note
7, at 656-57; Watts, supra note 24, at 883-88.
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in performing those services. Similarly, all leases, contracts, and other
documents should be executed by the beneficial owners and not by
officers or employees of the corporation. Of course, even the most care-
fully drafted instruments are of no assistance if their provisions do not
accurately reflect the facts. Thus, all the concerned parties must comply
with the specific provisions of all agreements. Most importantly, the
corporation's officers, directors, employees and shareholders should be
different from, and independent of, the beneficial owners of the property.
Yet, even though it is believed that adherence to these recom-
mendations will enhance the likelihood of a corporation maintaining
straw or nominee status, no assurance can ever be given that the cor-
poration will not be treated as a taxable entity.
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